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AFTER THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT:
STILL NO EQUAL PROTECTION FOR FIRST AMERICAN
WORSHIPERS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Early settlement of [the United States] was in large part due to
the search for a haven by persons whose religious beliefs and practices
had exposed them to disabilities, or even persecution, in their native
lands. This irrepressible need of the American to enjoy the freedom
• . . 'to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship
and observance,' in time compelled ... a reconstruction of all other
conditions of private thought and public life to make democracy,
with civil liberties as its basis and flower, a living reality. Religious
freedom is thus not only the crowning feature but is also the basis
of American society.'
This statement reflects one of the most important initial purposes for
the colonization of the United States. Unfortunately, the founding fathers'
philosophy did not consider that the new republic's constitutional protection of fundamental liberties would extend to persons not of their
race. 2 Throughout American history this ethnocentrism has manifested
itself in the interpretation of constitutional rights as applied to American
Indians.
Although Native Americans have been given legal status as "wards"
of the federal government, as individual citizens of this country, they
ostensibly enjoy the same protection of fundamental rights in the Constitution as non-Indian citizens.' Unfortunately, however, Native Amer-

1. MILTON KoNvITz, FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES OF A FREE PEOPLE 31 (1957).

2. According to the founding fathers, the settlement of the New World and the creation of a
new form of government was not divinely meant to benefit those of other races:
Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people
- a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language ....
This country and this people seem to have been made for each other ... it was
the design of Providence, that an inheritance so proper and convenient for a band
of brethren .... should never be split .... To all general purposes we have
uniformly been one people; each individual citizen everywhere enjoying the same
national rights, privileges and protection.
THE FEDERALIST No. 2, at 38-39 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
3. See Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912); Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053 (1990). "Indians
like other citizens are embraced within our Nation's 'great solicitude that its citizens be protected
... from unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty."' Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2063 (quoting
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978)).
This article discusses the treatment of Indians by government as individual citizens protected
under the Constitution. It does not deal with free exercise rights under their position as "wards"
under the framework of the federal government-Indian relationship. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). The judiciary defers to regulatory treatment of Indians by the. federal
government under its plenary power to regulate Indian affairs utilizing Indian race-specific legislation.
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icans have been consistently denied equal protection under the First
Amendment. For the most part, the Anglo-American court system has
found that the Constitution offers no protection for Indian worshippers
in the exercise of their unique religions.
Not until after the 1990 case, Employment Division v. Smith, 4 when
the United States Supreme Court overturned long-settled free exercise
jurisprudence, was there an effort to remedy the threat to religious
practice. In 1993, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA). 5 The purpose of RFRA is to restore the judicial use of
traditional strict scrutiny in cases where religion is burdened by neutral
government action.6 Unfortunately, the effect of RFRA in protecting
Indian religious freedom is dubious. 7
In this paper I argue for the application of Fourteenth Amendment
principles to the unfair treatment of Free Exercise claims by Native
American worshipers. Part II examines traditional constitutional doctrines
formulated in non-Indian Free Exercise claims. Part III compares the
judicial treatment of Indian and non-Indian religions, contending that
native claims challenging the development of sacred land sites have not
been given the same doctrinal treatment as those claims brought by
mainstream Judeo-Christian plaintiffs. This comparison reveals a clear
denial of equal protection of free exercise rights for Indians due to
cultural bias on the part of Anglo-American courts. Part IV discusses
the Smith decision and its placement of religious freedom protection into
the political sphere. Part V examines RFRA's purpose and discusses
whether RFRA will adequately protect Indian religious liberty. Finally,
Part VI examines Indian free exercise claims from the standpoint of
traditional and non-conventional equal protection theories. My goal is
to construct a workable challenge to the unequal treatment of Indian

See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903).
If the modern doctrine of strict scrutiny were to be applied to all classifications

based on "Indian-ness," the entire structure of Indian law would crumble. This
result has been avoided, first, by characterizing [federal] classifications between
Indians and non-Indians as political rather than racial and, second, by according
the federal government special deference in the area of Indian legislation because
of the sui generis status of Indians both constitutionally and historically.
Ralph W. Johnson & E. Susan Crystal, Indians and Equal Protection, 54 WASH. L. REV. 587, 59293 (1979) (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552-53 (1974)); see also, Morton v. Ruiz, 415
U.S. 199 (1974); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977). Congress has not curtailed First

Amendment religious freedom of Native Americans. In fact, the 1978 American Indian Religious
Freedom Act [hereinafter AIRFA] embodies a federal policy to protect Indian religion, although
the judiciary has not found that the act creates judicially-enforceable rights. See the discussion on"
the AIRFA in Section V.
4. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
5. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb).

6. Id.
7. Some leaders, chief among them Senator Daniel Inouye, have recognized that Indian religions
will not be adequately protected under the RFRA. They have successfully lobbied for the introduction

of a bill, the new American Indian Religious Freedom Act, which specifically addresses Indian
religious freedom concerns.
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religions so that Native Americans may have their free exercise claims
properly analyzed under the traditional First Amendment doctrine of
strict scrutiny. Equal protection analysis of Indian free exercise claims
would better insure the fair treatment of Indian religions and would offer
constitutional protection to the free worship of the first Americans.
II.

TRADITIONAL FREE EXERCISE DOCTRINES PRIOR TO
SMITH

Before the Supreme Court's ruling in Smith,' free exercise claims were
generally analyzed using a two-part test. In general, courts accepted a
claimant's sincerity in his or her religious belief. 9 Following this, the
government action was measured under the strict scrutiny doctrine. First,
courts looked to see if the intrusion on religious liberty was in furtherance
of a compelling governmental interest, then queried whether less restrictive
means were available to allow the government to achieve its goal.' 0 The
full application of the strict scrutiny analysis made the government's
burden substantial. In Sherbert v. Verner, the Supreme Court held that
"no showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state
interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, '[o]nly

the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for
permissible limitation.""' Even if the interest was deemed paramount,
the government entity was still required to demonstrate that it was choosing
means that were least burdensome to the harmed religious activity. 2

8. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
9. The sincerity test appears to have a low threshold for Indian as well as non-Indian worshipers.
In Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 107 U.S. 136, 144 (1987), the Supreme Court
considered newly-adopted religious beliefs to be sincere. The non-Indian plaintiff in that case converted
after accepting employment which conflicted with her religious belief. Thus, she actually created
the conflict herself. In Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 696 (1986), the Court accepted the Indian
claimants' contention that their belief (that the government's use of a social security number injured
the spirit of their daughter) was religious.
10. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The Supreme Court held that Amish parents
were immune to criminal punishment for violating a state compulsory education law. The Court
believed that the state's significant interest in educating its citizens was not "totally free from a
balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically
protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment .... " Id. at 214; see also Reynolds
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), wherein the Court upheld the federal conviction of a Mormon
polygamist. Although the Court did not articulate the compelling government interest test as such,
it believed that state prohibitions of actions "subversive of good order" were constitutionally
permissible. Id. at 164. Before Smith, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), was considered the
leading free exercise case. In Sherbert, a Seventh-Day Adventist was fired and consequently denied
unemployment benefits because she refused to work on Saturdays, her sabbath. Id. at 399-400. The
state's interest in limiting unemployment benefits was considered significant, but was not deemed
to be compelling enough when weighed against the burden on the plaintiff's religion. Id. at 40608.
l1. 374 U.S. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
12. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-07 (1940) (conditioning religious solicitation
upon a license is a forbidden burden upon free exercise protected by the Constitution because the
state was the agent determining what was a "religious" purpose for the permit, and it had less
drastic means of preventing fraud and preserving peace, safety, and order). See also Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). "[Tlhe notion at the core of Murdock was plainly that the
state could reasonably meet its legitimate needs for regulation and revenue without imposing potentially
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In the case of United States v. Lee, the Supreme Court retreated from
its prior position which placed a heavy burden of proof on the government. 3 According to Lee, the government needed only to demonstrate
a more broadly defined interest in a general law or governmental action
and show that granting an exception for the claimant would "unduly
interfere" with that interest.' 4 The holding in Lee began a reversal of
accommodations. Rather than explaining that its interest in denying the
plaintiff an exemption was compelling, the government entity merely
needed to argue that the policy behind its law or activity was compelling
enough to warrant a burden on religious activity.
Moreover, the threshold at which courts found a constitutional burden
on religion was much lower prior to Smith. The fact that a government
activity only indirectly intruded upon religious liberty did not preclude
a free exercise claim. This is evident in the Sherbert holding, where the
Court ruled that First Amendment protection applied even where the
government merely withheld an economic benefit from a plaintiff because
of religious beliefs. 5 The Supreme Court reiterated this important principle
in Thomas v. Review Board, holding that an indirect burden in the form
of the denial of unemployment benefits could form the basis of a free
exercise challenge. 16 The Court's treatment of indirect burdens as worthy
of constitutional review, coupled with the least restrictive means test,
essentially required the government to permit one's religious activity
whenever such accommodation would be workable in the view of the

court.' 7 Most important, what remained consistent after Lee (for non-

Indians at least) was the Court's rejection of an indirect-direct burden
dichotomy.Is

crushing burdens on religious activity." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1253
(2d ed. 1988); see also Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961) (Even indirect burdens are
impermissible if the state can accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose such a burden.);
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (Governmental interest in combatting
racial discrimination in education outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on religious
beliefs; additionally, petitioners' interests cannot be accommodated with that compelling interest,
and no less restrictive means are available.).
13. 455 U.S. 252 (1982). The Supreme Court rejected a claim for social security tax exemption
for a self-employed Amish farmer.
14. Id.at 259.
15. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403-04. See the discussion on judicial treatment of Indian sacred site
claims infra section III.
16. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). "Here, as in Sherbert, the employee was put to a choice between
fidelity to religious belief or cessation of work; the coercive impact on Thomas is indistinguishable
...Id. at 717.
from Sherbert.
17. The 1961 case, Braunfeld v. Brown, held that the Constitution does not prohibit a facially
neutral law which merely operates to make the practice of religious beliefs more expensive. 366
U.S. 599 (1961). However, the opinion did apply strict scrutiny, holding that incidental burdens
are forbidden if the state has less intrusive means available to achieve its goal. Id. at 607.
18. At times, federal courts have applied strict scrutiny to invalidate legislation which burdened
some Indian religious activities not involving sacred sites. See Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska
1979) (Alaska state law which prohibited the killing of moose out of season was held inapplicable
to Indian plaintiffs who took moose for religious ceremony.); see also People v. Woody, 394 P.2d
813 (Cal. 1964) (California state law prohibiting possession of peyote held inapplicable to bona fide
members of the Native American Church.); Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975) (Indian
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The use of the two-part strict scrutiny analysis for First Amendment
claims involving either direct or indirect burdens upon religious activity
insured that courts conducted a meaningful balancing of governmental
and individual interests. Government intrusion upon religious liberty was
permitted for "only those interests of the highest order and those not
otherwise served . . . ." 9 In the few Native American cases where courts
have applied strict scrutiny, the standard allowed some Indian plaintiffs
to successfully challenge government regulations which placed even an
indirect burden on certain types of religious activity.20 On the other hand,
some non-Indian free exercise challenges were unsuccessful. 2' Indeed, it
seemed Indian religious activity and Judeo-Christian worship were treated
equally whenever courts actually required the government to show both
a compelling interest and that less restrictive means were not available.
Although strict scrutiny was the established method of analyzing religious freedom claims before Smith, the test was not always used in
cases involving native religions. An interesting 1986 case, Bowen v. Roy,

involved an unsuccessful Indian challenge to the operation of the federal

government's social security system. 22 In Bowen, the Supreme Court held
that a neutral law which was a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate
public interest was not subject to strict scrutiny, even though it caused
the plaintiff to violate an important tenet of his religion. 23 The holding
in Bowen is intriguing when one considers that it involved a Native
American plaintiff. In the following year in Hobbie v. Unemployment

prison inmate permitted to wear his hair long on the ground of religious freedom).
Since Teterud, a lower level of review has been applied to prison regulations. See, e.g., O'Lone
v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348-50 (1987) (courts defer to prison administrators, requiring the
government to show only that its prison regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate phenological
interest). This deference exists apparently because courts are reluctant to substitute judicial judgment
for that of prison administrators in determining what, if any, least restrictive means are available.
Thus, the governmental goal is automatically considered paramount when measured against the
prison inmates religious interest.
Notwithstanding these cases, the Supreme Court has denied equal protection to native religions
by its ad hoc use of the indirect-direct burden dichotomy and judicial tests of centrality and
establishment. See discussion on sacred sites infra Section III. After Braunfeld, the Court's use of
the indirect burden analysis to find facially neutral laws constitutionally permissible did not again
occur until Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). See also Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Protective
Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990). Bowen, Lyng,
and Smith all involved claims by Native American worshipers.
19. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
20. See supra note 18.
21. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252
(1982). See also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) wherein the Court rejected
a non-Indian religious university's claim for special tax treatment on the grounds that the school
had racially discriminatory admissions policies. Although the policies were religiously motivated, the
government's interest in eradicating such discrimination outweighed the burden on the university's
rights, and no least intrusive means were available to the government to achieve its goal. Id. at
604. See also Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985), where the
Court denied a non-Indian religious organization's claim for exemption from labor laws on the
grounds that the government interest in uniformly enforcing its laws outweighed the very minimal
burden on plaintiff's religion. See also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), where the
Court rejected an Orthodox Jew's claim to wear a yarmulke while on military duty because of
judicial deference to the military. As in prison regulation cases, the Court feels it improper to
second-guess military decisions.
22. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 707-08 (1986).
23. Id.
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Appeals Commission, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that incidental burdens on religious freedom resulting from the24 operation of a
generally applicable law did not deserve strict scrutiny.
III. THE UNEQUAL TREATMENT OF INDIAN SACRED SITE
CLAIMS: A COMPARISON OF INDIAN AND NON-INDIAN FREE
EXERCISE CLAIMS REVEALS CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS
BIAS
Sacred land sites are an integral part of native theology. Continued
access and preservation of the pristine character of these lands is critical
to Indian religion practitioners. Medicine men gather natural plants and
healing herbs for traditional ceremonies handed down centuries ago from
the holy people. Prayers are directed to specific sites, as many Indian
nations have origin narratives which speak of mountains, lakes and valleys
as the very embodiment of holy beings. 25 The newly proposed Native
American Free Exercise of Religion of 1993 explains: "the religious
practices of Native Americans are integral parts of their cultures, traditions
and heritages and greatly enhance the vitality of Native American com' 26
munities and tribes and the well-being of Native Americans in general.
Since the take-over of the continental United States by non-Indians, and
the restriction of Indian people to reservations, most tribes' sacred sites
have since fallen into government or private non-Indian hands. 27 Because
of the land-based nature of native religion, government action to develop
land or regulate non-Indian activity most often and most seriously threat2

ens Indian religion . 8

Unfortunately, the strict scrutiny doctrine has generally been ignored
by courts in dealing with Native American challenges involving sacred
religious sites on non-Indian lands. In fact, in sacred site cases American
Indians have been systematically denied the doctrine's balancing process.
As discussed below, because such cases involve challenges to government
control of non-Indian land, federal courts have refused to regard such
claims as deserving of First Amendment protection. As a result, sacred
site challenges have been invariably unsuccessful.
A.

Indispensability
In the opinion of the courts, burdened religious activity on Indian holy
sites is not central or indispensable to native religions. If worship can
be performed at places other than the site of the proposed government
activity, no burden on free exercise is found. Therefore, the government
is not required to come forth with a compelling reason for its proposed

24.
25.
Indian
26.
27.
Indian
28.

480 U.S. 136 (1987).
See R.S. Mandosa, Another Promise Broken: Reexamining the National Policy of the American
Religious Act, 40 FED. B. NEws & J. 109 (1993).
S. 1021, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(2) (1993).
See Kristen L. Boyles, Saving Sacred Sites: The 1989 Proposed Amendment to the American
Religious Freedom Act, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1117, 1122-25 (1991).
Id.
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activities, nor demonstrate a less burdensome alternative for achieving
its goal. In United States v. Means, the Eighth Circuit summarized the

judicial treatment of sacred site cases in which there has been a consistent
refusal to disturb governmental land management decisions that have
been challenged by Native Americans on free exercise grounds. 29 The
court in Wilson v. Block went even further, placing an impossible burden
on Indian worshippers. "If the plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the
government land at issue is indispensable to some religious practice,
whether or not central to their religion, they have not justified a First
Amendment claim .... [Plaintiffs must] demonstrate that the government's proposed land use would impair a religious practice that could
not be performed at any other site." 30
The only Indian free exercise case involving a challenge to government
development of a sacred site in which the court purported to employ
strict scrutiny was Badoni v. Higginson.3 ' In Badoni, however, the court
first reasoned that the government interest was so compelling it automatically outweighed the religious interests of the Indians.3 2 Thus, the
court ignored the important question of whether, and to what extent,
the government action-flooding a holy site-burdened Indian religion.
The court did not properly balance or even consider the Indian parties'
interest in the sacred land. "The Badoni court essentially changed the
whole nature of free exercise analysis by allowing the government to
justify its actions first, rendering the degree of infringement analysis
unnecessary." 33

29. 858 F.2d 404, 407-08 (8th Cir. 1988). The court in Means listed:
Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Decision to permit private interests
to expand and develop government-owned ski area did not violate the First Amendment rights of Navajo and Hopi Indian tribes, who were not denied access to the
San Francisco Peaks in the Coconino National Forest or impaired in their ability
to gather sacred objects or conduct ceremonies.); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d
172 (10th Cir. 1980) (Impounding water to form Lake Powell and allowing tourists
to visit the Rainbow Bridge National Monument did not violate the free exercise
rights of the Indians residing in the area because they were able to enter the
monument and because the Government had a compelling interest in maintaining
the lake's capacity.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981)); Sequoyah v. Tennessee
Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980) (Cherokee Indians' free exercise rights
were not infringed by the flooding of the Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee
River in the absence of evidence of centrality or of indispensability of the particular
valley to be flooded to Cherokee religious observances), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953
(1980); Inupiat Community of Arctic Slope v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182 (D.
Alaska 1982) (Inupiat religious claims were found to be without foundation as they
offered no explanation of the religious significance of the site or of how the
Government's activities might interfere with plaintiffs' religious beliefs.), aff'd on
other grounds, 746 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 820 (1985);
Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982) (Indian plaintiffs' free exercise
rights were not infringed by state's construction of a paved access road and parking
area near ceremonial religious grounds because plaintiffs failed to establish that
particular religious practices were impaired by the construction.).
30. 708 F.2d 735, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (emphasis added).
31. 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977), aff'd, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 954 (1981).
32. Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 177 (10th Cir. 1980).
33. Camala Collins, No More Religious Protection: The Impact of Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protection Association, 38 WASH. U. J. URn. & CONTEMP. L. 369, 380 (1990).
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In contrast, non-Indian free exercise claims are rarely scrutinized for
the centrality or indispensability of the burdened religious conduct. In
Thomas v. Review Board, the Supreme Court stated that "the resolution
of [what is religious] is not to turn upon a judicial perception of the
,,34 In most conventional
particular belief or practice in question ....
free exercise cases like Thomas, there is no inquiry into the question of
centrality; the indispensability of the activity to the faith is simply a
given. 35 In fact, although the centrality of a particular activity has been
plainly arguable, the Court has still applied First Amendment protections.
In Thomas, "the claimant was admittedly struggling with his beliefs;
other members of his religion disagreed with his views as to what actions
seemed
the beliefs forbade; and his translation of beliefs into actions
'36
inconsistent. Nonetheless, the free exercise clause applied.
Compare the Thomas holding with the rationale in Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority.17 In Sequoyah, the flooding of Indian holy places,
ancestral burial grounds and ceremonial medicine gathering sites was not
considered a burden upon native religion:
The claim of centrality of the Valley to the practice of the traditional
Cherokee religion ... is missing from this case. The overwhelming
concern of the affiants appears to be related to the historical beginnings
of the Cherokees and their cultural development. It is damage to
tribal and family folklore and traditions, more than particular religious
observances, which appears to be at stake .... These are not interests
protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment."
The Sixth Circuit's cultural bias is plainly evident in its relegation to the
status of "folklore" the plaintiffs' religious activity on land that represented the very basis of Cherokee religion and cultural identity.3 9
Ironically, such places of "historical beginning" 4 are often considered
to be the most sacred locations to many native religions. What nonIndians often see as folklore and tradition are in fact the essence of
Indian life, religion and cultural identity. In West Virginia Board of
Education v. Barnette, the Supreme Court stated: "If there is any fixed
star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion
or other matters of opinion." ' 4l Despite the Court's reasoning in Barnette,
the decision in Sequoyah clearly rested on judicial perception, an AngloAmerican view, of what constituted "religious" activity.

34. 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
35. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). In Yoder,
the Court did emphasize the centrality of the Amish beliefs and, the holding in Sherbert rested
partly on the undisputed notion that the burdened activity was a cardinal principle of the plaintiff's
faith. However, these inquiries were merely used as an evaluation of the extent of the burden which
the religion suffered as a result of the government rule. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 1243. In Indian
sacred site claims, the centrality question is used as an absolute test.
36. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 1243.
37. 620 F.2d 1159, 1164-65 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1164.
41. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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B.

Establishment
Concerns over governmental establishment of religion have also caused
courts to misconstrue Indian sacred site claims. In Crow v. Gullet, the
federal court rejected the Indian plaintiffs' claim, believing that government accommodation of the Indians' worship would violate the Establishment Clause. 42 The court stated, "at Bear Butte State Park, religious
campers have a special camping area [among other privileges], from which
the general public is excluded .... Thus, defendants have gone far to
afford special treatment and special privileges to American Indian religious
practices at the Butte." ' 43 The Crow court felt that protecting the sacred
area from intrusion by tourists would violate the Establishment Clause
because it would aid the conduct of the Indians' religious ceremonies."
Similarly in United States v. Means, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that
"the [Indians'] Monument [might] become a government-managed religious shrine .... Query whether granting a special use permit for the
construction of a permanent religious community on 800 acres of public
land would raise similar issues of government aid to religion in violation
' 45
of the Establishment Clause."
The judicial application of the Establishment Clause to sacred site
claims is perhaps the best illustration of unfair treatment of Indian free
exercise claims. Indeed, there is often the potential for conflict between
the Establishment Clause and the mandate that government not prohibit
the free exercise of religion. However, "[w]hile the two clauses are in
tension in some respects, the Supreme Court has made it clear that antiestablishment principles may not serve as the means of denying valid

42. 541 F. Supp. 785, 794 (D.S.D. 1982).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. United States v. Means, 858 F.2d 404, 408 n.6 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting Badoni v. Higginson,
638 F.2d 172, 179 (10th Cir. 1980)). The Eighth Circuit ignored the district court's ruling for the
Indian plaintiffs. The district court resolved the establishment concern by comparing the Indians'
requested relief to affirmative measures already taken by the Forest Service in accommodating
Christian worshipers. The district court in United States v. Means stated:
The Forest Service expresses concern that by allowing Means and others use of
this federal property it may be advancing the religious interests of a particular
group in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. This
position is particularly ironic in light of the number of Christian churches which
exist on land in the Black Hills National Forest and the Placerville Camp of the
United Church of Christ. The irony is further enriched by the fact that Christian
groups, unlike the Lakota, do not consider the Black Hills to be a location central
to their religious beliefs. The Court recognizes that it is not always easy to determine
when accommodation is prohibited and when it is required under the Religious
Clauses .. . the Court concludes that making the 800-acre site available to Means
and others through the use of a special use permit would not violate the Establishment
Clause. Indeed, it is a necessary accommodation under the Free Exercise Clause.
627 F. Supp. 247, 264 (W.D.S.D. 1985).
In fact, there are several religious facilities, the operation of which would seem to violate the
Establishment Clause. "The Gloria Dei (Old Swedes) Church and St. Joseph's Roman Catholic
Church in Philadelphia, the Shrine of the Ages Chapel in Grand Canyon National Park, the
Yellowstone National Park Chapel and Yosemite National Park Chapel are each owned and operated
by the National Park Service." Sarah B. Gordon, Note, Indian Religious Freedom and Governmental
Development of Public Lands, 94 YALE L. J. 1447, 1456 n.38 (1985).
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free exercise rights."' 46 Nonetheless, in Means the Eighth Circuit reversed
the state district court's finding that the free exercise clause required
accommodation of Indian worshipers' activity through use of a special
permit allowing access to restricted sites on United States Forest Service
land. 47 The Eighth Circuit's ruling rested on the Badoni Court's establishment concerns.
The issues of centrality and establishment have generally not presented
hurdles for non-Indian plaintiffs who sought government accommodation
of some sort for their religious activity. For example, in a case where
non-Indians have similarly challenged government land-based regulation
on free exercise grounds, their religion was considered worthy of the
traditional strict scrutiny balancing test. In Pillar of Fire v. Denver Urban
Renewal Authority, the court held that urban renewal plans must avoid
conflicting with religious facilities on private land because "religious faith
and tradition can invest certain structures and land sites with significance
which deserves First Amendment protection. ' 4 The court did not attempt
to decide if the site was central or indispensable to non-Indian religion,
it simply held that the plaintiffs' church was burdened and deserved
constitutional protection. The Colorado Supreme Court demonstrated that
the First Amendment, at times, requires what may seem like government
establishment, but in fact is merely protective accommodation of particular
religious sites.
The Indirect Burden Analysis
The United States Supreme Court has condoned and reinforced this
unequal treatment of Indian sacred site claims. The Court does not feel
such cases deserve strict scrutiny, even when government action threatens
to destroy Indian religion. This is illustrated in Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Protective Association, where the Court held that there was no
constitutionally recognizable burden on Indian religion resulting from the
building of a road through a Native American sacred site because the
United States Forest Service did not intentionally set out to burden Indian
religion. 49 One commentator has noted that "because the Lyng Court
focused on the nature of the government action rather than the effect
of the action, the Court severely narrowed the protection that the first
amendment has traditionally given religious practices and incorrectly concluded that there was no burden on any Native American Indian religious
practice." 50
C.

46. See Gordon, supra note 45, at 1470-71 n.102 (citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978);
School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296-99 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)).
47. United States v. Means, 858 F.2d 404, 410-11 (8th Cir. 1988).
48. 509 P.2d 1250, 1254 (Colo. 1973).
49. 108 S. Ct. 1319, 1326 (1988) ("[llncidental effects of government programs, which may
make it more difficult to practice certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce individuals
into acting contrary to their religious beliefs [do not] require government to bring forward a
compelling justification for its otherwise lawful actions.").
50. Samuel D. Brooks, Note, Native American Indians' Fruitless Search for First Amendment
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Measure Lyng against the non-Indian unemployment compensation cases
wherein the withholding of benefits was seen as an indirect burden not
only worthy of strict scrutiny, but deserving of protection under the First

Amendment." This same application of the First Amendment to the
denial of government benefits 'which create an indirect penalty for adherence to religious belief has not occurred in Indian sacred site challenges.
This discrepancy exists because "no benefit in the commonly understood
sense of the term flows from government's leaving sacred sites on public

land undisturbed.'
D.

'52

Judicial Ethnocentric Views of Indian Religions

The manner in which sacred site cases are handled by the American
judiciary reflects ethnocentric Anglo concepts of religion and property.

The judicial belief that continued access to sacred sites prevents a burden
on Indian religion ignores the harm to the natural and sacred state of
the land. Road construction, opening of a site to public access and
tourism, or otherwise disrupting the natural character of the sacred area
is desecration. These acts may virtually destroy the basis for the native
religion and render worship at such sites pointless.53 Given that non-

Protection of Their Sacred Religious Sites, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 521, 545 (1990). In a scathing
dissent in Lyng, Justice Brennan stated:
[T]he Court embraces the Government's contention that its prerogative as landowner
should always take precedence over a claim that a particular use of federal property
infringes religious practices. Attempting to justify this rule, the Court argues that
S. . 'incidental effects of government programs,' . . . even those 'which may make
it more difficult to practice certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce
individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs,' simply do not give rise
to constitutional concerns . . . . Since our recognition nearly half a century ago
that restraints on religious conduct implicate the concerns of the Free Exercise
Clause, . . . we have never suggested that the protections of the guarantee are
limited to so narrow a range of governmental burdens. The land-use decision
challenged here will restrain respondents from practicing their religion as surely and
as completely as any of the governmental actions we have struck down in the past,
and the Court's efforts simply to define away respondents' injury as nonconstitutional
are both unjustified and ultimately unpersuasive .. . . Ultimately, the Court's coercion test turns on a distinction between governmental actions that compel affirmative conduct inconsistent with religious belief, and those governmental actions
that prevent conduct consistent with religious belief. In my view, such a distinction
is without constitutional significance. The crucial word in the constitutional text
.
is 'prohibit,' .. . a comprehensive term that in no way suggests that the
intended protection is aimed only at governmental actions that coerce affirmative
conduct.
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 465-68 (10988) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
51. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
52. Gordon, supra note 45, at 1460.
53. See Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 740 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (testimony of Hopi tribal
leader that development would destroy basis of religious belief); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d
172, 177 (10th Cir. 1980) (the religious infringement was the drowning of Navajo gods); Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 592 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (government
logging activities would impair the religious significance of the sacred area).
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Indian religions were portable from the time of their arrival in this
country, it is easy to see why Judeo-Christian courts simply do not
recognize that unique landmarks of mother earth are the very cornerstone
of Native American Indian religion.
This theological bias has its roots in the Anglo-American view of
property ownership. In Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority, for
example, the Cherokee's challenge to the flooding of their sacred sites
failed in part because the Indians had no property rights in the area
that was to be developed. 4 Likewise, in Lyng, the majority opinion held
that "such [religious] beliefs could easily require de facto beneficial
ownership of some rather spacious tracts of public property.""5 In fact,
Indian theologies are fundamentally at odds with non-Indian concepts
of religion and property:
The pioneer and development ideals of the westward movement in
the nineteenth century glorified taming the Wilds in the interests of
progress and prosperity. These ideals still inform the national civil
religion and stand in opposition to Indian concepts of cyclical rather
than linear history .... To the extent, therefore, that the judiciary

is influenced by American civil religion and traditional monotheistic
understandings of spiritual separation from the physical world, claims
by Indians that development of public lands violates their religious
beliefs would seem at once obstructionist and counterproductive. In
this land of great freedom and republican virtues, this ideology argues,
we must not allow regressive attitudes-even religious ones-to get
in the way of the greater good. Some exceptions are allowable, because
they are relatively cost-free, but Indian free exercise claims would
to alter its understanding of its property rights
require government
56
in public lands.

54. Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980). The Pillar of Fire
holding (supra text accompanying note 48) has been distinguished, based on the view that "a
governmental taking of privately owned religious property ... involves different considerations than
does a claimed First Amendment right to restrict government's use of its own land." Wilson v.
lock, 708 F.2d 735, 742 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Similarly, Justice O'Connor stated in Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Protective Ass'n: "Whatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the area
... however, those rights do not divest the Government of its right to use what is, after all, its
land." 485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988). One commentator has observed:
The existence of a property right in a sacred site is not a prerequisite of a free
exercise claim, however. As the legislative history of AIRFA states: 'The issue is
not ownership .. . of the lands involved. Rather, it is a straightforward question
of access in order to worship and perform the necessary rites.' . . . The 'property
interest' basis for denying free exercise claims raises the question, of course, of
where the government 'got' the property in the first place. As Representative Udall
noted, 'it is stating the obvious to say that this country was the Indians [sic] long
before it was ours.' . . . If the taking was unjust to begin with, it seems especially
egregious to use the lack of a legal interest in land to deny a free exercise claim
for protection of preexisting sacred sites.
Gordon, supra note 45, at 1455.
55. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453. "Lyng demonstrates that either the courts fundamentally do not
understand the significance of the government-sanctioned desecrations to Indian religion or they are
intentionally carving Indian religious expression out of the protected arena of the first amendment."
Anita Parlow, Cry, Sacred Ground: Big Mountain, U.S.A., 14 AM. IND. L. REV. 301, 316, n.56
(1989).
56. Gordon, supra note 45, at 1464.
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IV. THE SMITH DECISION'S RELEGATION OF FREE
EXERCISE PROTECTION TO THE POLITICAL ARENA
Cultural and religious bias by courts have denied Indian worshipers
the equal protection of the First Amendment in sacred site cases. In
Smith, the Supreme Court went even further by taking the fundamental
right of religious freedom out from under the First Amendment, and
placing it squarely into the political process:
In Smith, the Court departed sharply from its precedent in the
religious liberty area by rejecting the compelling interest test. The
Court held that, except in a few nebulously defined cases, the government is not required to make exceptions from a generally applicable
law for religious groups whose free exercise is burdened by the law.
Though the Court explicitly affirmed the power of the legislature to
accommodate burdened religious groups, it held that such accommodations are
not required by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
57
Amendment.

Smith held that a facially neutral law which only indirectly burdens free
exercise is not assailable under the First Amendment.58 This necessarily
meant that worshipers had to be pro-active in the legislative process in
order to get specific exemptions in generally applicable laws which would
otherwise burden their religion. The narrow reading of the Free Exercise
Clause in Smith gave "a decided advantage to 'majority' religions, that
is, religions that have a substantial number of followers or which for
some other reason command a great deal of respect in society." 9 Indian
worshipers, however, are not part of mainstream culture and thus will
have a more difficult time securing specific legislative exemptions for
their religious practices, compared to Judeo-Christian sects.6 Although

57. Michael W. McConnell, Should Congress Pass Legislation Restoring the Broader Interpretation
of Free Exercise of Religion?, 15 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 181, 183 (1992). See generally Susan
E. Simoneau, An Anomaly: Religious Freedom Protected Through Political Process Rather Than
the First Amendment, 13 BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 155 (1992).
58. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1606 (1990).
59. McConnell, supra note 57, at 186.
60. Legislative exemptions are not the method by which the Framers intended the fundamental
liberty of religious freedom to be protected.
When religious conscience came into conflict with a generally applicable law prior
to the enactment of the First Amendment, it was not unusual for the colonies and
the states to allow exemptions from these laws. The most notable accommodation
occurred when the Continental Congress created an exemption from military conscription for adherents to faiths that forbade participation in war.
McConnell, supra note 57, at 186. See also Justice Blackmun's dissent in Smith:
This distorted view of our precedents leads the majority to conclude that strict
scrutiny of a state law burdening the free exercise of religion is a 'luxury' that a
well-ordered society cannot afford, and that the repression of minority religions is
an 'unavoidable consequence of democratic government.' I do not believe the
Founders thought their dearly bought freedom from religious persecution a 'luxury,'
but an essential element of liberty - and they could not have thought religious
intolerance 'unavoidable,' for they drafted the Religion Clauses precisely in order
to avoid that intolerance.
Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1616.
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the Smith rationale had potentially harmful impacts on other non-Indian

religions, 61it primarily threatens Native American religions and their practitioners.
V.

CONGRESS RESPONDS TO SMITH WITH THE RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT

The Smith decision was seen as abolishing the religion clause of the
Bill of Rights. 62 After Smith was decided, a broad movement of concerned
organizations introduced legislation to restore the compelling interest and
least burdensome means tests which the Supreme Court had essentially
discarded for all but those cases involving government action directly
aimed at suppressing religious conduct. In 1991, an act was proposed
with the narrow purpose of circumventing Smith and restoring traditional
free exercise doctrines. 63 The result was the November 1993 enactment
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
A. The Language and Purpose of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act
RFRA codifies the compelling interest test as it existed in free exercise
case law prior to Smith. Specifically, its purpose is to restore the use
64
of the Wisconsin v. Yoder and Sherbert v. Verner strict scrutiny analyses.

61. See Part VI of this article for a discussion on the application of equal protection theory
to Indian religion claims. "As federal courts are now constrained to follow Smith, we can expect
a rash of decisions denying citizens who are not members of mainstream Judeo-Christian religions
the protections of the First Amendment." Daniel L. Inouye, Discrimination and Native American
Religious Rights, 23 U. WEsT L.A. L. REv. 3, 18 (1992) (citing Hunafa v. Murphy, 907 F.2d 46,
48 (7th Cir. 1990); International Center for Justice and Peace v. I.N.S., 910 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1990);
Salvation Army v. New Jersey Dep't of Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 194-95 (3d Cir. 1990);
Salam v. Lockhart, 905 F.2d 1168, 1171 n.l (8th Cir. 1990); South Ridge Baptist Church v. Indus.
Comm'n of Ohio, 911 F.2d 1203, 1213 (6th Cir. 1990); Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of
Hastings, Mich., 740 F. Supp. 654, 669-70 (D. Mich. 1990); Montgomery v. County of Clinton,
743 F. Supp. 1253, 1259 (W.D. Mich. 1990); Yang v. Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558, 559 (D.R.I.
1990)).
The application of the Smith rationale to other minority religions should in no way diminish the
validity of equal protection claims by a particular minority, namely American Indians. In fact,
courts predisposed to defending traditionally-protected non-Indian religions have had leeway to
circumvent Smith. In State v. Hershberger, 444 N.W.2d 282, 284 (Minn. 1989), Amish appellants,
adhering to the most basic tenet of their religion to remain separate from the modern world, refused
to display a florescent triangular emblem on their horse drawn carriages when operating on state
public highways. The Minnesota Supreme Court utilized traditional strict scrutiny and held that
appellants' religion had been infringed upon by the state's issuance of a traffic citation for legitimate
reasons of highway safety. Id. at 289. However, because requiring the Amish to use lighted lanterns
was a less restrictive available means of furthering the state interest, the court upheld the Amish
claim. Id. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in
light of Smith. Minnesota v. Hershberger, 495 U.S. 901 (1990). On remand, the state court again
dismissed the charges against the Amish defendant, reasoning that Minnesota's constitution guaranteed
state citizens a greater degree of religious liberty protection than the First Amendment. State v.
Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1990).
62. Inouye, supra note 61, at 17.
63. Paul S. Zilberfein, Note, Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon
v. Smith: The Erosion of Religious Liberty, 12 PACE L. REv. 403, 440 (1992) (citing H.R. 2797,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)).
64. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 §2(b)(1), Pub L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(1993) [hereinafter RFRA].
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RFRA narrowly answers the Supreme Court's assumption in Smith that
the compelling interest and least intrusive means tests are not to be
applied whenever neutral, generally applicable government action is challenged. Under RFRA, strict scrutiny is now required if government
"substantially" burdens religious exercise, even if only indirectly through
a neutral law. 65 Once a substantial burden is found to exist, courts must
then determine if the means used are "in furtherance of a compelling
government interest."6

B.

RFRA Will Not Protect Native Americans
Unfortunately, RFRA will not "restore" religious freedom to Indian
people. It must be remembered that both Lyng and Smith were Native
American free exercise claims. The Supreme Court in these cases strengthened the notion that the Constitution does not prohibit neutral government
action from impinging upon or even destroying religious liberty. Even
though RFRA was enacted to overturn this reasoning, it will not guarantee
Constitutional strict scrutiny protection to Native American worshipers.
Simply speaking, there is nothing to "restore" since Native Americans
did not enjoy the full judicial protection of their religious freedom even
before Smith.
Moreover, RFRA is not meant to address the ingrained judicial misconceptions of Indian religions. There is nothing in RFRA that changes
pre-Smith misconceptions about Native American sacred sites and religions. The Congressional Judiciary Committee that reviewed RFRA stated:
It is [our] expectation that the courts will look to free exercise of
religion cases decided prior to Smith for guidance in determining
whether or not religious exercise has been burdened and the least
restrictive means have been employed in furthering a compelling governmental interest .... This bill is not a codification of any prior
free exercise decision but rather the restoration of the legal standard
that was applied in those decisions.6 7
Thus, the language used in RFRA-"substantially burden"-will enable
courts to approach Indian claims with a business as usual attitude. Given
the usual judicial insensitivity to native religions, it is possible that no
Indian religious activity, especially on sacred sites, will be considered
substantially burdened. Since RFRA mandates that strict scrutiny be used
only if a burden is first found, Indian free exercise claims will likely be
resolved in the very same manner as before. In fact, the Judiciary
Committee took care to assure Congress that the pre-Smith treatment of
Native American cases would remain undisturbed under RFRA. The
committee stated, "[p]re-Smith case law makes it clear that strict scrutiny
does not apply to government actions involving only management of
internal Government affairs or the use of the Government's own property

65. Id. §3(a).
66. Id. §3(b)(1).
67. H.R. REP. No. 88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1993).
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or resources." ' 6 Interestingly, the committee referred in this statement to
the Bowen and Lyng decisions, both of which involved unsuccessful
Native American free exercise claims.
Similarly, courts will fail to find legally cognizable burdens upon religion
because RFRA only requires the government to show its means further
a compelling interest, rather than prove its means are essential to that
interest. To clarify, a three-step inquiry into the language "least restrictive
means of furthering a governmental interest" would be helpful. First, is
the general goal of the government serious and compelling enough to
possibly warrant intrusion on religious liberty? A proper approach to
this first question fully compares the interests of the government entity
and the individual. For example, one possible determination which could
result from such a thorough weighing process is a holding that the
government goal is simply not important enough to justify destroying
the ability to worship, even if the goal involves some type of economic
development of a certain piece of public land. Prior case law makes it
clear that such a holding for a Native American plaintiff is highly unlikely.
Only after this first step is fully explored and the court is satisfied that
the government interest is paramount, should it proceed to the next two
questions.
The next two queries would then involve a judicial determination of
the range of available options which the government may use in achieving
its goal. 69 The second question should ask: Does the method which the
government has chosen merely assist in its compelling program, or is it
absolutely essential in enabling the government to achieve that goal? The
final question is closely related, but must be carefully distinguished. It
should ask: Are the means which intrude upon religious activity somehow
modifiable so that the intrusion is lessened as much as possible, e.g.
statutory exemptions, or should the method be discarded altogether in
favor of another which impinges on religion the least? Under this approach, a court with the usual insensitivity to native worship could decide
either: 1) the means used are acceptable and, although they are not
essential to the government goal and alternatives do exist, it does not
legally matter because the method does not "substantially" burden religion; or 2) the means used are absolutely critical in achieving the
government goal, and although they substantially burden religion, the
Constitution permits them because no other practical less intrusive alternative is available.
This analytical breakdown of the legal test in RFRA shows that there
is much room for judicial insensitivity and cultural bias in determining
the outcome of an Indian RFRA claim. It seems only fair that, in the
balancing test between government action and individual religious conduct,
68. S. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. V(c); see also 139 CONG. REC. S6464 (1993)
(statement of Sen. Inouye).
69. The Court has recognized that this is the case, for, in the area of prisoner free exercise
rights, it has declined to make this inquiry because it feels it is not in an appropriate position to
determine which methods should be permitted and which should be invalidated. See, e.g., O'Lone
v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
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each activity be considered at least important enough to the respective
interests to create a meaningful weighing process. However, under RFRA,
government action need only further a goal, while Indian religious activity
will continue to be misunderstood and held to a requirement of essentiality
or indispensability. This burden upon Indian religions has proven impossible to meet in the eyes of courts who possess a theology completely
at odds with native religion.
In an Indian sacred site case where the state or federal interest may
possibly be achieved through some other means more directly connected
to the goal, the judiciary will likely not require the government to prove
that such workable alternatives exist. Courts will simply look to the
legislative history of RFRA and stick to their previous jurisprudential
regime.
In a non-sacred site case such as Smith, it is also questionable whether
a RFRA-based free exercise challenge would be successful. Adhering to
RFRA's codification of the Yoder analysis, perhaps courts will define
the state interest narrowly as an interest in denying an exemption for
peyote use. Courts could then require the government to prove how such
an exemption would undermine the general workability of the drug laws:
In terms of the specific issue addressed in Smith, this bill would
not mandate that all states permit the ceremonial use of peyote, but
it would subject any such prohibition to the aforesaid balancing test.
The courts would then determine whether the State had a compelling
governmental interest in outlawing bona fide religious use by the
Native American Church and, if so, whether the State had chosen
70
the least restrictive alternative required to advance that interest.
However, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Smith indicates that
the peyote religion would fail to pass strict scrutiny 7 ' and as the statement
to protect the
above indicates, that there is no intent behind the RFRA
72
Native American Church in its religious use of peyote.

70. H.R. REP. No. 88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
71. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (1990).
72. A stronger American Indian Religious Freedom Act, while not guaranteeing that Indian
plaintiffs would always win, would at least better ensure that their religions would be treated fairly.
The proposed Native American Free Exercise of Religion Act of 1993 (NAFERA) would legalize
religious use of peyote and apply the compelling interest test to government agencies harming sacred
sites through development on federal land. It would also ensure tribal control over federal projects
on Indian land which would potentially harm sacred areas. The new NAFERA would strengthen
Indian free exercise rights with respect to procurement of endangered species animal parts and would
make it more difficult for penal institutions to deny native inmates their right to worship. See
generally S. REP. No. 1021, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
The Fourteenth Amendment provides a firm basis for a new, stronger American Indian Religious
Freedom Act. Congress has specific authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment
"to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§5. To the extent Congress finally recognizes that Indians do not enjoy equal treatment with regard
to their Free Exercise rights, Congress may act to guarantee equal protection of the First Amendment
through legislation which requires government accommodation of Indian religion. See generally
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and Response to the Critics, 60
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 685 (1992). In Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Supreme Court held that Section
Five is "a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in
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VI.

AN EQUAL PROTECTION ARGUMENT FOR INDIAN
RELIGIOUS CLAIMS
Traditional free exercise analysis 73 under the First Amendment has
consistently failed to protect Indian worshipers. In evaluating Native
American religious claims, the courts have consistently refused to consider
such cases under strict scrutiny because of establishment concerns, the
absolute test of centrality, and the indirect burden analysis. These judicial
doctrines have not been applied to deny Judeo-Christian plaintiffs the
protection of the First Amendment. Unfortunately, RFRA will not alleviate this problem.7 4 The Fourteenth Amendment, however, would offer
a method for challenging the unfair treatment of Indian religions. Unlike
a non-Indian religion claim under First Amendment analysis, there is an
element of discrimination in the courts' treatment of Indian free exercise
claims. Thus, there is a need to include equal protection theory within
an Indian religious liberty claim.
Arguing equal protection would not be a hybrid of the doctrines used
in First and Fourteenth Amendment cases. Rather, an Indian plaintiff
should bring a free exercise or RFRA claim and utilize equal protection
theory to challenge the unequal treatment of Indian religions. This disparate treatment has come primarily from the courts, and most recently
from Congress in the form of RFRA. The goal is to prompt courts to
treat Indian religion cases the same as those of non-Indians, by considering
Indian claims under the compelling interest and least restrictive means
tests.
determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
If enacted, the new NAFERA would significantly alter the status quo with its extensive, Indianspecific mandates. Therefore, it could be considered that NAFERA would grant special treatment
to Indian worshipers. However, it would not violate the Establishment Clause. See generally Boyles,
supra note 27. However, even if its enactment constituted special treatment, Congress has full
authority under Section 5 to remedy past racial discrimination with race-specific legislation. See
generally Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 221.
Professor Laycock draws a comparison between the RFRA and the Voting Rights Acts, which were
passed in an effort to guarantee voting rights to African-Americans who were the primary group
being denied their rights because of prejudice.
The Voting Rights Acts do not confer race-specific legal benefits as the NAFERA proposal does.
However, the Supreme Court has permitted racially based remedial legislation, even without a finding
of past racial discrimination in a particular area. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497
U.S. 547 (1990). The Court has also allowed preferential treatment for Indians based on their special
relationship with the federal government. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
Moreover, it can be strongly argued that the United States Government has an affirmative duty to
protect Indian religions and sacred sites because of the trust doctrine. See generally Jeri Beth K.
Ezra, The Trust Doctrine: A Source of Protection for Native American Sacred Sites, 38 CArT. U.
L. REV. 705 (1989).
73. Of course, after Smith, the First Amendment no longer protects religious activity from
generally applicable laws, even if the laws effectively destroy the basis of the entire religion itself.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1603 (1990). The criminalization of peyote, in particular,
which the Smith decision sanctions, threatens to destroy the religion of the Native American Church.
"Although peyote serves as a sacramental symbol similar to bread and wine in certain Christian
churches, it is more than a sacrament. Peyote constitutes in itself an object of worship; prayers
are devoted to it much as prayers are devoted to the Holy Ghost." People v. Woody, 394 P.2d
813, 817 (Cal. 1964).
74. See supra Section V.
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Equal Protection Theory
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment states that "Congress
shall make no law . .. prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." This
clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 75 In turn,
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution says that
"[n]o State shall . .. deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." ' 76 By reverse incorporation, the Supreme Court
held in Bolling v. Sharpe77 that the equal protection prohibition of the
Fourteenth Amendment also binds the Federal Government.
Equal protection challenges are directed at government action which
disparately affects a member of a suspect class or burdens a fundamental
applies regardless if the challenged
right. 78 Also, equal protection analysis
79
A.

law is only indirectly burdensome.

Once a court has determined that the operation of a legislative scheme
burdens a suspect class or a fundamental right, that law is considered
presumptively invidious.80 The burden then shifts to the government and
the law will only be upheld if it is "precisely tailored to serve a compelling
government interest."1

1. A Fundamental Right is Burdened
In a Native American religious liberty claim, the fundamental right to
religious freedom is involved.8 2 "The individual guarantees contained in
the First Amendment, including the free exercise of religion, were among
the first to be afforded fundamental right status .... As a textual

guarantee, the free exercise of religion has a strong claim on heightened
scrutiny. '83

The first level of burden which American Indian religions currently
suffer is due to government action. Twenty-three states still have no
protection for bona fide religious use of peyote; it is considered a

75. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
76. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
77. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
78. Shelly v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
79. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
80. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215-17 (1982). Once a plaintiff is determined to be a member
of a suspect class, the Court then approaches the individual's claim with a presumption that 1) the
law disparately affecting the person was enacted with at least a collateral purpose of discriminating;
or, 2) benefits of a law are somehow being withheld from that person because of his or her
membership in the suspect class. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeny, 442 U.S. 271, 272-73 (1979).
This presumption exists because in the Court's view, laws which affect suspect classes in a
discriminatory manner are "more likely than not to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative
rationality in pursuit of some legitimate objective. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218.
81. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217.
82. See supra note 45 for a discussion of the theory that religious freedom is indeed a fundamental
right that was meant to be strictly preserved under the Bill of Rights.
83. Rex E. Lee, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Legislative Choice and Judicial Review,
1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 73.
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controlled substance and Indians may be arrested and criminally prosecuted for its use. 4 As explained above, RFRA will not offer adequate
protection to Indian peyote users. 85 In addition, the basis of many tribal
religions is endangered. Forty-four sacred sites within the United States
are currently threatened by government development.8 6
Native American worshipers have also been burdened by the federal
and state judiciaries. When Native Americans have challenged government
action such as that mentioned above, they have been denied equal treatment under the First Amendment because their worship is so unusual
from the perspective of Judeo-Christian courts. The comparison between
the Supreme Court's treatment of Indian free exercise claims and those
claims of mainstream worshipers reveals a true disparity.
In the non-Indian cases which established the traditional free exercise
use of strict scrutiny, most individuals sought an exemption from generally
applicable government regulation. In sacred site cases, Indians seek injunctive relief to prevent the desecration of holy places. This relief is
considered too extraordinary to be granted. 7 Because in such cases "the
requested relief and the underlying faith are different than those usually
involved in free exercise claims, [courts] have generally treated the uniqueness of the claim as vitiating against the Indians' claim . . . courts have
implied that the very uniqueness of Indian religions provides a basis for
'88
denying the claims."

2. Indians Are a Suspect Class
With respect to religious liberty, American Indians certainly qualify as
a suspect class. In San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, the Supreme
Court defined a suspect class as one that has been "subjected to such
a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position

84. ROBERT M. PEREGOY, BRIEFING DOCUMENT: THE NEED FOR SPECIFIC
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM LEGISLATION NOTWITHSTANDING RFRA 7 (1993).

NATIVE

AMERICAN

85. See supra Section V(B).
86. WALTER ECHO-HAWK, BRIEFING DOCUMENT: NATIVE AMERICAN FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
ACT (S.1021)(NAFERA) 3 (1993).
87. See Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that government interest
outweighed Indian interests in sacred rites, without considering the burden on Indian worshippers).
88. Gordon, supra note 45, at 1461-62.
The sacred site decisions arguably reveal what Professor Derrick Bell labels the "interest conversion
theory." His contention is that white institutions, in enacting remedies for minorities under the
equal protection doctrine, have failed to initiate approaches which may ultimately infringe upon
their interests in some significant way. This "interest convergence" phenomenon can clearly be seen
in the school desegregation measures after the Brown v. Board of Education decisions:
The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when
it converges with the interests of whites ... the availability of fourteenth amendment
protection in racial cases may not actually be determined by the character of harm
suffered by blacks or the quantum of liability proved against whites. Racial remedies

may instead be the outward manifestations of unspoken and perhaps subconscious
judicial conclusions that the remedies, if granted, will secure, advance, or at least
not harm societal interests deemed important by middle and upper class whites.

Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93
HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980). In sacred site cases, native worshipers have not been granted the
remedies they sought.
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of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from

the majoritarian political process." '

9

The political powerlessness of American Indians in the protection of
their religious freedom will be discussed further; 9° however, purposeful
unequal treatment of native worshipers by the federal government began
91
in the 1890's in the form of outright prohibition of Indian religions.
for
Although bans were lifted in 1934, Indians may still be arrested
92
possession of sacred objects such as peyote and eagle feathers.
Today, this unequal treatment continues in legislative form through
state criminalization of peyote use, governmental land management policy,
and judicial mistreatment of sacred site claims. It also continues in the
Supreme Court's relegation of religious liberty protection to the political
arena where American Indians lack the lobbying power to ensure that
specific exemptions for their religious activity will be included in generally
applicable laws. Finally, unequal treatment continues with the implementation of RFRA. It is clear that RFRA is not intended to change
the pre-Smith jurisprudence of the courts as it has been applied to the
disadvantage of native practitioners.
B. Using Equal Protection Theory to Challenge Unequal Judicial
Treatment of Indian Religions
Admittedly, there would be considerable difficulty in getting the courts
to examine their own unjust treatment of Indian religions. But, the equal
protection argument is an alternative framework for the appellate courts
to justify employing strict scrutiny. Courts should recognize that the
American judiciary has essentially acted just as the legislatures in equal
protection claims. With concerns regarding centrality, establishment, and
the use of the indirect burden test, judges have applied First Amendment

89. 411 U.S. 1,28 (1973).
90. Of course, Native Americans also suffer political powerlessness due to extensive federal
control over Indian nations. See generally Robert A. Williams, Columbus's Legacy: Law as an
Instrument of Racial Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples' Rights of Self-Determination, 8
ARIZ. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 51 (1991).
From its assumptions of a presumed superior sovereignty in a European-derived
government over indigenous tribal peoples, subsequent Supreme Court decisions
constructed the principle of Congressional plenary power in Indian affairs. Its
impairment of rights to self-rule and property for "savages" provided the origins
of the diminished tribal sovereignty doctrine in United States Federal Indian Law.
Id. at 74.
91. Inouye, supra note 61, at 13.
92. Id. at 14. "In the wake of Smith, the State of Oklahoma is currently prosecuting a lifelong member of the Native American Church for possession of peyote." Inouye, supra note 61,
at 17. Again, the legislative history of the RFRA demonstrates no intent to stop states from
prohibiting peyote possession. See also United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986). Several federal
acts provide for criminal prosecution of anyone killing bald eagles and selling their parts. Although
the Bald Eagle Protection Act has an exemption for Native Americans to take birds for religious
purposes, there is a long and burdensome procedure to first secure a permit for such a taking from
the Secretary of the Interior. 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (1992). NAFERA would streamline this process.
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doctrinal tests in an unequal fashion to Indian plaintiffs. These tests are
requirements which suspect class Indian plaintiffs have been unable to

meet.
Although most equal protection challenges are directed at legislative
action, there is precedent under the doctrine for the invalidation of judicial
action as well. In Shelly v. Kramer, the Supreme Court nullified the

state court enforcement of a private housing covenant which was racially
discriminatory. 91 Similarly, in Palmore v. Sidoti, the Court reversed a
state family court's decision removing a child from her mother's custody,
since the ruling was apparently based on the mother's remarriage to a

black man. 94 The majority in Palmore reasoned "[p]rivate biases may
be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly,
give them effect." 95 Thus, it is not unreasonable to suggest that appellate

courts and the Supreme Court strictly scrutinize lower court decisions
which burden Indian religions.
The notion that this unequal treatment of Indians by the Judeo-Christian
judiciary has been "purposeful" is, of course, arguable. However, when
one considers that sacred site cases have been so consistently treated
unfairly compared to non-Indian claims, to the detriment of native worshipers, and that Lyng and Smith departed severely from well-settled
First Amendment doctrine and involved Indian religions, the argument
is certainly persuasive that Anglo-American courts have discriminated

invidiously. 96 Courts at the very least have "reflect[ed] a tradition of

hostility toward an historically subjugated group, or a pattern of blindness
or indifference to the interests of that group." 97
C.

Using Equal Protection Theory to Challenge Smith
The Smith holding itself should be invalidated under Fourteenth Amendment analysis. As discussed, the judicial notion that an indirect burden
on religious activity does not warrant First Amendment strict scrutiny
places minority rights into the political process. Thus, a comparison of
93. Shelly v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). In Shelly, the covenant actually specified racial
restrictions. However, the Court has also invalidated the judicial enforcement of neutral laws when
there is a racially discriminatory impact. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478-79 (1954)
(Although state jury selection system was "fair on its face and capable of being utilized without
discrimination," the criminal conviction of a Mexican-American was overturned since members of
his race were systematically excluded from jury service and there were many Mexican-Americans
qualified to serve.). In fact, "[d]iscrimination in jury selection . . .,has frequently been demonstrated
by reliance on statistics showing a racially discriminatory pattern of administration." TRIBE, supra
note 12, at 1483.
94. 466 U.S. 429 (1984)..
95. Id. at 433.
96. Mandosa argues, "The centrality test articulated in Sequoyah and the coercive effects test
of Crow represent alternative ways courts have used to defeat Indian religious plaintiffs. In these
cases, the government was never required to show a compelling interest, in a departure from
precedent, because the courts have been reluctant to make the preliminary finding of burden upon
the free exercise right. These sacred site cases, taken together, reveal an inescapable pattern of
prejudice against Native American religion .... " Rita Sabina Mandosa, Another Promise Broken:
Reexamining the National Policy of the American Religious Freedom Act, 40 FED. B. NEws & J.
109, 109-10 (1993).

97.

TRIBE,

supra note 12, at 1520.
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the Smith holding to equal protection cases reveals that its rationale
violates the Fourteenth Amendment. After the landmark Brown decisions, 98 some state legislatures felt that court-ordered busing as a remedy
for racial discrimination subverted the democratic wishes of the majority.
However, in Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, the Supreme
Court struck down a state law which preserved a system of segregation
by preventing student assignments to other than the closest schools. 99
"By selecting out a form of legislative action of particular interest to
racial minorities and removing it to a different and less accessible level
of government, the Washington initiative changed the rules of the game
and put minorities at a distinct disadvantage."' 100 Similarly, the Court
invalidated a state law which prohibited student busing assignment on
the basis of race.' 0 It recognized that minorities could not effectively
protect their interests through legislative action, and busing was a legitimate judicial remedy not to be undermined by apparently race-neutral
legislative action.
The Supreme Court's removal of Indian free exercise rights from the
protection of the First Amendment means that minorities will suffer
disparate treatment in the protection of their fundamental rights:
These [mainstream] religions, because their numbers give them substantial political influence, will be able to enter and win protection
in the political arena. In addition, their members are often involved
in the drafting of legislation, and they generally design the laws
(consciously or unconsciously) in light of their religious mores. The
religions that suffer under the narrow interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause are the unpopular, the unknown, and the unconventional. 102

98. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349
U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown I1).
99. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
100. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 1486.
101. Id. at 1521 n.2 (citing North Carolina v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971)). Swann is one of
many cases in which the equal protection argument has been used to successfully challenge laws
prohibiting any kind of racial consideration in government actions designed to remedy discrimination.
The Supreme Court has held that such "racial-remedy laws" must be protected from dilution by
counter-legislation which appears to prevent racial discrimination by prohibiting any government
action, legislative or judicial, that is specifically based on racial determination. In Hunter v. Erickson,
393 U.S. 385 (1969), the Supreme Court invalidated a city charter amendment which prevented the
enactment of ordinances addressing racial discrimination without the approval of a majority of the
city's voters:
The Court reasoned that 'although the law on its face treat[ed] Negro and white,
Jew and gentile in an identical manner, the reality [was] that the law's impact [fell]
on the minority,' [because minorities were the groups] who would obviously benefit
from laws barring racial, religious or ancestral discriminations, and thus it was
minorities whom the amendment deliberately disadvantaged.
TRIBE, supra note 12, at 1485 (quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391).
Hunter is significant because the Court recognized that the majority voter requirement would
probably never be met and therefore it presumptively burdened politically powerless minorities. A
close analogy can be drawn between this case and the majority's placement of minority religion
protection into the political process in Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
102. McConnell, supra note 57, at 187. The Smith majority, in fact, acknowledges that minority
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This statement by Michael W. McConnell aptly describes Indian religions,
which will suffer because Indians have historically and consistently had
much less political power in comparison to non-Indians. 03
Specifically, in the area of religious freedom protection, the political
power of the Indian lobby has proven ineffective. Originally, the 1978
American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA)' °4 was enacted to respond to sacred site-specific concerns. Despite AIRFA's purpose, however,
it did not enhance the protection of native religions as was hoped. AIRFA
was intended only to ensure regular free exercise protection to native
religions, 05 and courts have interpreted it as such." °6 For example, the
Supreme Court made it clear in Lyng that AIRFA was no more than
a policy gesture. The majority opinion noted that "[n]owhere in [AIRFA]
is there so much as a hint of any intent to create a cause of action or
any judicially enforceable individual rights.' 0 7 Indeed, the passage of

beliefs such as the peyote religion will suffer, but that such a result is a necessary evil:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place
at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in
but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to
a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh
the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.
Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606.
103. Vine Deloria and Clifford Lytle explain:
Hostility between Indians and whites .. .has been a continuing theme in Indianwhite relations since the colonial farmers sought Indian hunting lands. State political
leaders, executive and legislative, have a tendency to respond to the economic
interests within the state, and these powerful groups, although frequently few in
numbers, represent the forces that constitute important elements of the society ....
While Indians participate in state elections, their influence and priority in state
affairs have always been minimal.
VINE DELORIA & CLIFFORD LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 42 (1983).
104. Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988)). The Act
embodied:
formal congressional acknowledgement that government action on public lands does
infringe Native American beliefs and practices to some extent, and that Indian
religions must be accorded meaningful protection in ways not generally necessary
for protection of Euro-American religious interests. The legislative history of the
AIRFA reveals that there was a need for such statutory protection of Native American
religion, because "[lhack of knowledge, unawareness, insensitivity and neglect are
the keynotes of the Federal Government's interaction with traditional Indian religions
and cultures."
Gordon, supra note 45, at 1458 n.55.
105. The Act was intended to "insure that the policies and procedures of various Federal agencies,
as they may impact upon the exercise of traditional Indian religious practices, are brought into
compliance with the constitutional injunction that Congress shall make no laws abridging the free
exercise of religion." Gordon, supra note 45, at 1457 n.49 (quoting S. REP. No. 709 & H.R. REP.
No. 1308, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. i (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1262).
106. Gordon, supra note 45, at 1458 n.53 (quoting Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 746 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (purpose of AIRFA is limited to ensuring that federal government's policies and procedures
are brought into compliance with Free Exercise clause)). The most that has been required in government
development projects is consultation with Indian religious leaders. See, e.g., New Mexico Navajo
Ranchers Ass'n v. ICC, 702 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (railroad was required to consult with tribal
religious leaders before approving new construction).
107. Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 455 (1988).
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AIRFA would not likely have been brought about at all, except that it
had "no teeth in it."' 1°8 This unfortunate fact displays the failure of
Indian political pressure to influence non-Indian lawmakers to make
AIRFA an effective mechanism for Indians to use in challenging government development of sacred sites.
The public reaction to Lyng also demonstrates the lack of Indian
political power to protect religious freedom. In 1988, the Supreme Court
held in Lyng essentially the same way it did in Smith two years later,
dispensing with the need for strict scrutiny. The majority held that, since
the Indian plaintiffs were not directly coerced by the government action
into violating their religious beliefs, "the Constitution simply does not
9
provide a principle that could justify upholding respondents' legal claims."'
Although the Supreme Court's reasoning in Lyng should have been
considered just as potentially devastating to everyone's religious liberty,
a broad based group of non-Indians did not recognize a threat to fundamental rights until Smith." 0
Most importantly, RFRA itself is evidence of the politically disadvantaged status of American Indians in comparison to that of whites. After
Smith, it took only three years to get RFRA passed. New AIRFA
amendments have been proposed in every congressional session since
before the Lyng decision. Yet, it is still not certain if NAFERA will be
passed any time soon. This is partially due to a lack of consensus among
lobbying tribes as to the best version of the amendments. However, there
also is significant opposition in Congress due to Establishment Clause
concerns."' Furthermore, the lack of congressional intent in RFRA to
give greater safeguards to Indian religious activity through the use of a
strict scrutiny guarantee most clearly proves the fact that American Indians
are politically unable to protect their First Amendment free exercise rights.
Because Smith itself places such Indian rights into the political process,
Smith violates the equal protection principle and should be overturned.
D. Challenging Government Action: Perhaps RFRA Violates Equal
Protection
This section raises the question of whether an Indian plaintiff could
challenge RFRA itself under the equal protection theory. On its face,
RFRA mandates the use of the Yoder strict scrutiny analysis in all free
exercise cases, even where generally applicable laws indirectly intrude
upon religious conduct. Thus, Congress evidently believes it does not

108. 124 CONG. REC. 21445 (1978) (statement of Rep. Udall).
109. Lyng, .485 U.S. at 440.
110. "[T]he retreat from First Amendment religious protection signified by Lyng went largely
unnoticed, probably because the worship of the land, including mountain tops and waterfalls, is a
practice unique in our country to Native Americans. It was not until its 1990 decision in Smith
that the Supreme Court's insensitivity to Native religious rights came to the attention of the general
public." Daniel K. Inouye, Discrimination and Native American Religious Rights, 23 U. WEST L.A.
L. REv. 3, 15 (1992).
Ill. See 139 CONG. REC. 56464-65 (1993) (statement of Sen. McCain).
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matter if a harm to religious activity is merely an incidental effect of a
neutral government action, or that a free exercise burden was inflicted
intentionally or inadvertently. The critical constitutional factor to Congress
is whether religion is "substantially burdened."
However, as explained in Section V, RFRA's legislative history clearly
indicates that this reasoning does not apply to Indian free exercise claims.1 2
In limiting the purpose of RFRA to pre-Smith doctrines, Congress has
refused to recognize the unique obstacles Indian religions alone have
suffered under that jurisprudence. By deferring to courts' treatment of
Indian claims, Congress has essentially codified judicial and legislative
discrimination against Indian religions. In taking it upon itself to rectify
the problems that Smith posed for free exercise plaintiffs, it is illegitimate
under the Fourteenth Amendment for Congress to practically deny the
benefits of RFRA to Indian worshipers." 3
Perhaps Congress did not set out to treat Native religion practitioners
maliciously. However, legislators had a very definite mind set surrounding
native religious claims when they carefully crafted RFRA:
It is worth emphasizing that although this bill is applicable to all
Americans, including Native Americans and their religions in keeping
with the Congressional policy set in the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act of 1978, the Committee recognizes that this bill will
not necessarily address all First Amendment problems by itself. Native
Americans have unique First Amendment concerns that Congress may
need to address through additional legislation." 4
This language is evidence that Congress foresaw the practical exclusion
of Indian religion from RFRA's strict scrutiny protection. Congress was
aware that an Indian sacred site case would likely be decided no differently
under RFRA today than before the act was implemented. Thus, it is
arguable that RFRA discriminates against a suspect class in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. "When the legal order that both shapes and
mirrors our society treats some people as outsiders or as though they
were worth less than others, those people have been denied the equal
protection of the laws.."' 5
Under the equal protection standard, once disparate impact is found,
a prima facie case for an equal protection violation is made and the
burden is shifted to the government."16 The government action is then

112. See supra section V(B) for a discussion of the Judiciary Committee's reference to the Bowen
and Lyng decisions, and its statement that RFRA does not legalize peyote.
113. See generally Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 221 (asserting that under the powers granted by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress
may not dilute the Bill of Rights, but it may enhance those rights on the basis of race).
114. H.R. REP. No. 103-88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1993).
115. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 1515 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.14 (1982)).
116. In applying the Equal Protection Clause to most forms of state action, we thus
seek only the assurance that the classification at issue bears some fair relationship
to a legitimate public purpose.
But we would not be faithful to our obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment
if we applied so deferential a standard to every classification .... Thus we have
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considered constitutionally infirm without a good explanation on the part
of policy makers. This explanation must be good - it must make it clear
that a law was not enacted, even as a collateral goal," 7 for the purpose
of discriminating against a suspect class.
Washington v. Davis, however, stands for the general rule that a
plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent somewhere behind a law to
sustain an equal protection challenge." 8 If there is a legitimate purpose
for the government scheme besides discrimination against a suspect class,
disparate impact itself does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment." 9
Nevertheless, because of the presumption of improper motive, that governmental scheme must be "precisely tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest." 2 0
Congress and the courts may fear that allowing the application of
Yoder to Indian sacred site claims would set judicial precedent for the
virtual return of the continent to the Indians. Therefore, Congress has
deferred to the judiciary's reluctance to examine Indian claims under
strict scrutiny because the proper application of the compelling interest
and least restrictive means test could possibly mean that 1) the building
of a road for access by tourists to a national park would have to be
considered subordinate to a First Amendment interest by Indian worshipers
that their ancient religion be allowed to continue to exist, and 2) the
government would be limited in the development of its own land for the
general non-Indian public, because building of a road in an area not
sacred would be an alternative less restrictive means.
Under the equal protection test of close and substantial relationship,
however, these fears are unfounded. Not all non-Indian land would be
considered sacred. The proposed new Native American Free Exercise of
Religion Act contains a list of forty-four very specific and limited areas
nationwide that are Indian sacred sites currently threatened by government
development.' 2' Also, many tribes share the same sacred sites, e.g., the
Navajo and Hopi share San Francisco Peaks in northern Arizona, and

treated as presumptively invidious those classifications that disadvantage a 'suspect
class,' or that impinge upon the exercise of a 'fundamental right.' With respect to
such classifications, it is appropriate to enforce the mandate of the equal protection
clause by requiring the State to demonstrate that its classification has been precisely
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. In addition, we have recognized
that certain forms of legislative classification, while not facially invidious, nonetheless
give rise to recurring constitutional difficulties; in these limited circumstances we
have sought the assurance that the classification reflects a reasoned judgment
consistent with the ideal of equal protection by inquiring whether it may fairly be
viewed as furthering a substantial interest of the state.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-18 (1982).
117. See Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 & n.25 (1979).
118. "Disparate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial
discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule that racial
classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable by the weightiest
considerations." Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
119. Id.
120. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982).
121. See ECHo-HAWK, supra note 86, at 3.
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the Yarok, Tolowa, and Karuk Indians share Chimney Rock in Northern
California. Chimney Rock is the piece of land which the United States
Forest Service sought to build a road upon in the Lyng case.
Regardless of the facial neutrality of RFRA, its operational failure to
protect Indian worshippers should be considered purposeful discrimination
because the exclusion of Indian religions is not precisely tailored to a
compelling government interest. Thus, notwithstanding the legislative history of RFRA, the Yoder doctrine of strict scrutiny, as required by the
statute, must be applied fully and equally to Indian plaintiffs if it is to
be applied to anyone. Yoder stands for the notion that the state must
go a step further than merely arguing its general law furthers a societal
goal. The government must also show that the refusal to grant an
22
exemption for religious plaintiffs is critical to achieve its public purpose.1
With the full Yoder protections, traditional free exercise scrutiny would
become available to Indian plaintiffs for the first time in decades. An
Indian peyote user could challenge a state's refusal to grant an exemption
for religious use of the drug. That refusal itself must be justified under
a compelling government interest standard. Just as in the Yoder scenario,
allowing an exemption for the Native American Church would not undermine the state's interest in fighting societal harms due to drug use. 123
In fact, an exemption would actually help further the state interest. 24
Similarly, the least restrictive means test could offer better protection for
sacred sites. The government entity would have the burden of proving
that an option to develop a different piece of government land for public
purposes must be unavailable. The operation of a general government
regulatory scheme is not enough of a compelling interest to deny free
exercise plaintiffs their fundamental rights. Yoder applied the compelling
interest test to the denial of exemptions.

122. For example, the refusal to grant an exemption to bona fide users of peyote in the Native
American Church should further the general governmental purpose of combatting the drug problem.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court defined the state's interest as an interest in denying the Amish
parents an exemption from the compulsory school attendance law. The Court upheld the Amish
claim because it felt that the parents did not frustrate the state's goal by teaching their children
at home past the eighth grade, but in fact assisted the state in reaching its general public goal in
ensuring educated citizens. 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972).
123. Because of Congress' failure to legalize peyote use, it would seem that the legislators perhaps
deferred to Justice O'Connor's opinion that a state's prohibition of peyote would withstand strict
scrutiny. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1614 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
However, because such bona fide use of peyote does not, in fact, harm the state's overall interest
in combatting the evils of drug use, it is hoped that a full judicial inquiry into a state's reason
for denying an exemption would yield a favorable holding for Indian peyote users. Nevertheless,
Congress' failure to legalize peyote should also be invalidated on equal protection grounds.
124. Justice Blackmun's dissent in Employment Div. v. Smith explains:
[J]ust as in Yoder, the values and interests of those seeking a religious exemption
in this case are congruent, to a great degree, with those the State seeks to promote
through its drug laws. Not only does the Church's doctrine forbid nonreligious use
of peyote; it also generally advocates self-reliance, familial responsibility, and abstinence from alcohol . . . . Far from promoting the lawless and irresponsible use
of drugs, Native American Church members' spiritual code exemplifies values that
Oregon's drug laws are presumably intended to foster.
110 S. Ct. 1595, 1619-20 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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E. The Requirement of Purposeful Discrimination Should Not Bar
Application of the Equal Protection Analysis
Even if one cannot accept the notion that intentional racial discrimination has occurred against Indian worshipers, equal protection analysis
should still be applied to the disparate treatment of Indian religions.
"Under traditional psychoanalytical theory, one would anticipate that
much, if not most, irrational prejudice operates at a level below the
conscious mind." 125 As discussed earlier, the very uniqueness of Indian
religions causes non-Indian misunderstanding and cultural bias to operate
against Indian people.
Furthermore, since religious liberty is such a fundamental right, it is
improper to require an invidious purpose behind a facially neutral law,
such as RFRA, which burdens that right. In Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,126 the first free exercise case in the
Supreme Court since Smith, the concurring opinion by Justice Scalia and
Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority's inquiry into the city
government's intent behind the city ordinance burdening the unpopular
Santeria religion. "[I]t is virtually impossible to determine the singular
'motive' of a collective legislative body, 127 . . . and this Court has a long
tradition of refraining from such inquiries.' ' 28 Perhaps in a Fourteenth
Amendment case not involving constitutionally enumerated rights the
Court may inquire into invidious purpose, but in a free exercise case,
it should not.
Often, the concept of equal justice under the law can only be preserved
without requiring minority plaintiffs to prove that lawmakers intentionally
chose a policy 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects
upon an identifiable group.' 1 29 Tribe explains:
In Washington v. Davis the Supreme Court feared that adoption
of a disparate impact test for equal protection analysis would threaten
a whole panoply of socioeconomic and fiscal measures that inevitably
burden the average black more than the average affluent white. That
might be a concern if all resource allocations that had a statistically
differential impact by race were automatically subject to strict scrutiny.
But there is a difference between an admittedly implausible affirmative
duty to help subjugated groups by every means possible' 0 ... and
a government responsibility not to sanction tests, rules, practices and
policies that predictably and avoidably perpetuate the inferior position
125. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 1519.
126. 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
127. Id. at 2239 (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-39 (1987) (Scalia, J.,dissenting)).
128. Id. (citing Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130-31 (1810); United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968). Tribe argues:
[I]f
government is barred from enacting laws with an eye to invidious discrimination
against a particular group, it should not be free to visit the same wrong whenever
it happens to be looking the other way. If a state may not club minorities with
its fist, surely it may not indifferently inflict the same wound with the back of its
hand.
TRIBE, supra note 12, at 1519.
129. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 1518 (quoting Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,
279 (1979)).
130. See supra notes 46 & 72 for a discussion on why judicial recognition of government
responsibility to protect sacred sites does not violate the establishment clause.
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of a group originally relegated to that position by a ruthless regime
of official discrimination and exploitation. 3 '

This discussion illustrates exactly the state of affairs for Indian free
exercise plaintiffs. Disparate judicial tests for Indian plaintiffs, and leg-

islative refusals to include exemptions for Indian worshipers in general
government laws or policies are the mechanisms by which mostly whites

in positions of power are perpetuating the denial of religious freedom,
and indeed culture and identity, to Indian people. With RFRA, Congress
has codified this regime of unequal treatment by structuring the act to
effectively exclude American Indians from the strict scrutiny protection
of the Yoder doctrine.
F.

The Social-Relations Approach

Under the constitutional mandate of equal protection, the government
cannot be callously indifferent to the needs of minorities. But, in what
manner should the government treat them differently? One commentator,
Martha Minow, advocates a social-relations approach to equal protection

analysis.

32

Rather than focusing on individual rights, judicial interpre-

tation of the Constitution should recognize that individuals have an
inherent right to the maintenance of their social relationships.'
Without
the continuation of these relationships, the concept of individual rights

becomes meaningless, for "people live and talk in relationships and never
134
exist outside them.'

In the case of American Indians, their unique religious activities are
an essential means by which they maintain their social relationships. As
with any faith, active traditional worship furthers and protects the unique
identity and spirituality of Native Americans as persons, both individually
and as tribal members. To traditional Indians holding on to what is left

of their culture and religion, it is essential that they remain Indian in
some appreciable way, rather than becoming totally assimilated into the
dominant culture. Thus, for Indian people, it is important that they be

131. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 1520. Concededly, legislators may not consciously set out to eradicate
Indian religions by choosing a particular sacred site to develop, or by refusing a peyote exemption
in a state drug law. However, the First and Fourteenth Amendments combined should require that
courts engage in strict scrutiny of even neutral government actions that burden Indians' free exercise
because non-Indian government decision-makers often do not consider, are unaware, or simply don't
care that their actions may harm Indian religions more than others. The American political process
is not the truly representative democracy it should be. Legislators do not engage in a full and
proper balancing of interests before enacting generally applicable laws. Thus, courts must be the
agents to patch up representative democracy by strictly scrutinizing, and sometimes invalidating,
those government actions that burden discrete and insular minorities. See United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
132. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW
110 (1990). See generally Richard Hertz, Legal Protection for Indigenous Cultures: Sacred Sites and
Communal Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 691 (1993).
133. MINOW, supra note 132, at 110-11. According to Minow, "the social-relations approach
assumes that there is a basic connectedness between people, instead of assuming that autonomy is
the prior and essential dimension of personhood." Id.
134. Id.
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allowed to maintain the special character of their social relationships
through traditional spiritual activities in concert with Mother Earth and
the sacred plants she offers.
Unfortunately, because native religions are fundamentally different from

those of Judeo-Christian society, the judiciary has treated them with
ethnocentric insensitivity.' 35 Courts have presumed that the special character of native religions is a basis for denying the claims of Indian

worshipers. 3 6 Congress, in turn, has accepted this biased reasoning. Thus,

the very uniqueness of native religion is viewed as a negative characteristic. 3 7 Minow argues that this type of attribution of difference
hides the power of those who classify and of the institutional arrangements that enshrine one type of person [in this case, religion]
as the norm ....
When public officials organize the world through
categories of difference, they select some traits from among many
and give them significance in distributing benefits and burdens. And
the traits usually selected reflect the experiences and privileges of those
making the selection. 138
Under a social-relations approach to equal protection analysis, Congress
and the courts would necessarily consider their own inclination to recognize
differences in a negative manner. If institutional decision-makers openly
acknowledged their own cultural intolerance of native religions, they would
more fully recognize their impact on those affected by their decisions.
Under equal protection theory, this ethnocentrism would be formally

acknowledged in the courts, and perhaps the proper balancing of religious
and governmental interests could take place.
VII. CONCLUSION
The treatment of Indian sacred site claims by American courts has
revealed a distressing insensitivity to native religions. Misguided centrality

and establishment concerns and the indirect burden rationale have resulted
135. Ethnocentrism, at the very least, if not racism. See generally Williams, supra note 90.
"Supreme Court decisions . . . acquiesce in the cultural racism of Christian Europeans who regarded
the 'character and religion' of Indian peoples as providing 'an apology' for claiming an 'ascendancy'
over them .... " Id. at 74. "Those who came to the New World seeking to pursue their own
vision of freedom and self-determining rights did so by transplanting an Old World form of cultural
racism denying respect to indigenous tribal peoples' own fundamental human rights of self-determination." Id. at 75.
136. Gordon, supra note 45, at 1464.
137. In essence, the conflict this article deals with is the irony that many native people wish to
preserve their cultural and religious heritage, remaining separate and apart from the American
mainstream much like their lighter-skinned Amish counterparts. Traditional Indians enjoy and even
depend on the preservation of their differences for a sense of identity and spiritual fulfillment.
"Yoked to the notion of difference . . . is the pride rooted in pre-Columbian sources from which
Indian tribes and tribal communities find cultural continuity and spiritual richness." Frank Pommersheim, Liberation, Dreams and Hard Work: An Essay on Tribal Court Jurisprudence, 1992 Wis.
L. Rav. 410, 424. However, the mainstream has so far penalized native peoples for their differences.
"Neither the legal community nor the dominant community at large well understand this pride of
difference. It is this pride that tests the vitality of 'old promises' in a diverse society that professes
a commitment to both equality and pluralism." Id.
138. MINOW, supra note 132, at 111-12.
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in judicial refusal to employ strict scrutiny even when government action
threatens to destroy Indian religions. In comparison to claims of nonIndians, Indian free exercise claims have not been given the same treatment
under traditional First Amendment doctrines. After Smith, and because
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is not likely to alleviate matters,
Indians may have to lobby non-Indian legislatures to get specific exemptions for their religious conduct. Unfortunately, legislatures are often
opposed to Indian needs. Thus, native worshipers will suffer an even
greater disadvantage than most in the protection of their religious freedom.
It is ironic that Congress should respond to the denial of American
Indian religious liberty in the Smith case with a law designed to return
free exercise cases to pre-Smith jurisprudence. In Smith, the Supreme
Court asserted that constitutional free exercise rights could be protected
from generally applicable laws through legislative action. The Court
explained that the failure to find constitutional protection for religious
activity did not necessarily stand for the idea that statutory protection
was not permitted or even desirable. 3 9 Indeed, the Court must have
realized the extreme departure it was making from traditional doctrine.
Congress did respond to Smith, but merely sent the ball back to the
courts. Yet, RFRA addresses Smith with language and intent that will
allow the usual judicial maneuvering around a proper compelling interest
inquiry and, most importantly, the least restrictive means analysis. This
passing of the buck by Congress fails to deal with the unique character
of Indian land based theology. Congress has so far refused to acknowledge
the disturbing fact that Judeo-Christian courts are blind to the severe
hardships faced by native religion, hardships which should rise to the
level of First Amendment infringement deserving of the Yoder strict
scrutiny application.
This article argues for the use of an equal protection analysis to prevent
Congress and the courts from denying native religious freedom claims
the proper protection of traditional free exercise doctrines. At issue is
the fundamental right of religious liberty enumerated in the Bill of Rights.
Native Americans are clearly members of a suspect class who have suffered
all manner of historic discrimination. The Fourteenth Amendment offers
an alternative framework for courts to dispense with unfair tests and to
challenge Congress' failure to include Indian religions within the strict
scrutiny protection of RFRA. Courts should then impose the compelling
government interest and least restrictive means criteria. Strict scrutiny
would not necessarily guarantee that all Indian claimants would be successful. However, it would offer the equal protection of First Amendment
legal standards that have historically been used with Judeo-Christian
religious claims.
Currently, American "legal categories embody dominant cultural assumptions that mistranslate the inner reality of Native American com-

139. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
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munities and require cultural conformity as the price of legal recognition."40
American Indians and native cultures should not be legally and institutionally penalized simply because their religions are different from the
mainstream and are incomprehensible to non-Indian lawmakers and courts.
It takes no wrenching of the equal protection doctrine to come up with
a workable approach that would give the meaningful constitutional protection enjoyed by others to the worship of those whose timeless religions
pre-date the coming of whites to this continent and the Constitution
14
itself. '
LURALENE

D.

TAPAHE

140. Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 759.
141. Indians do not have the same religious freedoms as other Americans, even though
their ceremonies developed thousands of years before Europeans-many of them
fleeing religious persecution-settled in the United States ....
Respect should be
given to a religion that does not involve going to church one day a week, but
which is based on animals, the world and the universe, and whose church is the
mountains, rivers, clouds and sky ....
Navajo Nation President Peterson Zah, quoted in ALBUQUERQUE J., Nov. 23, 1991, at I.

